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A ‘fertile ground for poisonous doctrines’?1 Understanding far-right 
electoral appeal in the south Pennine textile belt, c.1967-1979  
Historical far-right organisations have long proved pervasive, but are rarely 
interpreted as competitive political parties. While these minority parties and 
movements never secured significant representation, they influenced municipal and 
constituency political activity. Focusing on the ‘textile belt’ of Eastern Lancashire 
and West Yorkshire, this article seeks to understand how far-right organisations 
engaged in local electoral politics. It considers the influence of regional economic 
changes, caused by industrial realignment, and how opponents, primarily local 
Labour parties, interpreted post-war fascism and the concerns it engendered. The 
article then examines the growing influence of Labour’s anti-fascist campaigns, the 
popular appeal of far-right politics, and the composition of such group’s 
memberships. As far-right institutional archives are limited, the article uses 
material produced by predominant local Labour parties. Alongside providing new 
perspectives, it encourages scholars to interpret far-right organisations as electoral 
actors, rather than mere cultural and political pariahs.  
Keywords: National Front; Far-right; Decline; Yorkshire; Lancashire. 
Introduction 
British far-right organisations have seldom endured, while historical reassessments of 
them remain uneven.2 Great fascination in the British Union of Fascists (BUF) 
continues, making it becoming the third most written about group after the German 
Nazi party and Mussolini’s Fascist Movement.3 However, the attempted post-war 
revivals Oswald Mosley and Neo-Nazism during the 1950s and 1960s have inspired 
some rigorous interventions, engaging with new sources and innovative approaches.4 
Similarly, thorough reinterpretations of anti-fascist activism, understanding how 
opponents have reconsidered the activities of far-right groups, have reignited debates 
about the very meaning of fascism.5 Although these do not compare with the quantity of 
outputs related to the BUF, they have informed serious historical debate regarding how 
and why far-right extremism remained pervasive. Much of this retains a national focus, 
with local case studies limited to contemporaneous studies with little perspective.6 
There is, therefore, great opportunity to contribute to this growing literature of fascist 
studies within a British local and regional context.  
Although further analyses of their activities problematic, due to a restricted 
source base, inter-disciplinary readings have provided new frameworks for renewed 
investigation. Electoral geographers have proposed that local socio-economic conditions 
and electoral patterns are both interdependent and inseparable.7 Journalistic reportage 
and activist memoirs have advanced colourful accounts of idiosyncratic political 
cultures.8 Social researchers, often writing during peak National Front newsworthiness 
in the mid-1970s, provided urgent and immediate analyses.9 However, as political 
history, their perspective is limited, and current academic interest in the far right mainly 
focuses on present-day politics. Often national surveys, these primarily interpreted 
published material and dedicated polling data, but lacked access to institutional 
records.10 Such contemporaneous studies focus interprets such organisations in their 
present or very recent past.11 More recently, scholars of historic anti-fascism have 
primarily examined non-Labour opposition to the far right, interacting with Labour 
activism at the strategic, national level.12 Any renewed scholarship, therefore, requires 
alternative sources and approaches.  
In many cases, archival evidence is scarce, with far-right organisations rarely 
depositing unpublished records. However, alternative evidence exists for examining 
historic fascist group activities. Previously, local and regional case studies have 
illuminated the often ‘polymorphic nature’ of interwar fascism.13 Similar considerations 
must be applied to studies of the National Front. Geographically, their voters were 
concentrated in the same troubled heavy industrial areas, primarily the Pennine textile 
towns, Midland manufacturing districts, and parts of East London.14 While London has 
received most attention due to the density of Front support, a commonality is that 
activity was present in many Labour party heartlands.15  
In such seats, constituency Labour parties (CLPs) recorded, often at length, the 
issues, pressures, and organisations achieving electoral purchase among local voters. 
Although these sources are problematic, their strength is that they provide opinions and 
perspectives otherwise forgotten.16 Often underexploited, they provide a rich, 
distinctive, and politically aware commentary of local electoral dynamics and political 
activity.17 As National Front candidates participated in elections against local Labour 
candidates, CLP minute books recorded the concerns they engendered. This encourages 
interpretation of the relationship between influential local factors, such as socio-
economic change at the local level and socio-cultural and political peculiarities, to 
determine the National Front’s electoral appeal in the 1970s.  
When studying political organisations, terminology is important, and requires 
definition. This article uses the term ‘far-right’ as an umbrella to describe and discuss 
the activities of the National Front and similar organisations, accounting for their views 
on migration and race. It takes in the world-views of members who considered 
themselves ‘fascists’ and ‘Nazis’, alongside fellow-travelling populists, authoritarian 
nationalists, and organised intolerants.18 Defining the historic far right is difficult. 
However, work undertaken among political scientists, differentiating between a ‘radical 
right’ (populists) and an ‘extreme right’ (fascists) has proved significant. 19 While 
accepting Herbert Kitschelt’s caution regarding the historicist origins of interwar 
fascism, the National Front clearly grew out of the union of a number of smaller fascist 
groups, as anti-fascist group publicity campaigns often reminded them, with a 
leadership drawn from the memberships of these fascistic, predecessor, organisations.20 
For the historian, drawing on these useful nuances reinforces complexities present in the 
evidence. 
Post war, ‘fascism’ remained a protean and flexible term, but greater subtlety is 
required to locate fellow travellers.21 Some groups discussed in this article, such as the 
Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration, were Powellite radical populists, while other 
National Front antecedents were clearly of fascistic origin.22 There is also a practical 
reason, as how their voters and supporters perceived them was important. As with the 
French far right, the recentness of the Second World War forced these organisations to 
design policies obscuring some members more fascist inclinations, for obvious 
reasons.23 However, as this does not mean that their leaderships ceased to be fascists in 
worldview, but that they presented themselves as something else. Only through 
examining localised, far-right political activity is it possible to discern the impact of 
their appeals to voters. To better interpret localised electoral dynamics, this article 
considers the south Pennine textile belt, located along the border between Lancashire 
and the West Riding of Yorkshire.24  
Intense industrialisation, focused in wool, worsted, and cotton, alongside 
associated dying and commercial industries, created mill towns with unique political 
cultures.25 While textiles were not such settlements only industries, wool and cotton 
were fundamental to their development, informing local cultures and stereotypes.26 By 
using a case study, we also avoid generalisation and nation-centric focus.27 Similarly, 
taking in a broader, regional case study, larger than a solitary settlement, addresses 
problems inbuilt into the single case study through illuminating deeper, comparative 
issues, affecting similar but different localities in diverse ways.28 For example, a 
researcher can consider how the National Front sold an economic ‘policy’ simplifying 
international finance management along racial lines to unemployed textile workers in 
the south Pennines.29 To do this, the article explores historical upsurges of anti-migrant 
activities in the south Pennine textile belt, and the institutional origins of the National 
Front. It then discusses the importance of political and socio-economic realignments in 
1970s Britain to the far right’s attempts to garner sufficient electoral appeal to concern 
established parties. Finally, it examines the nature of Labour anti-racist campaigns in 
the textile belt in the late 1970s, to interpret how mainstream, party-political activists 
interpreted and addressed far-right appeals. 
Regional political culture and origins of the National Front 
The electoral purchase of anti-migrant sentiment, which underpinned the popular appeal 
of the National Front, was neither new nor revolutionary in the south Pennine 
borderlands. Before 1914, anti-Irish discrimination had sometimes erupted into 
violence, such as the 1860’s Murphy Riots.30 Volatile anti-migrant politics had a long 
history, but none was more prescient than Sir Oswald Mosley’s BUF. Despite some 
exaggeration of their influence, they possessed some appeal in Northern England.31 
Through intricate rhetorical strategies, the BUF capitalised on interlinked opportunities 
provided by the Great Depression, ineffective established parties, and popular 
dissatisfaction.  
Mosley’s party constructed a multi-layered appeal, which did not require all 
voters to purchase its darker, ideological elements.32 Similar complexities were existent 
with its membership. Not all fitted the Wodehousian stereotypes of heavy drinking, 
criminality, and extreme viewpoints. Many reflected popular concerns regarding 
deprivation and unemployment, seeing fascism as an untried, potential antidote to the 
Great Depression.33 This idiosyncratic mix of apparent concern, ‘real’ experience, and 
ideology had potential appeal in areas of economic trouble, particularly southern 
Lancashire. 
It is worth dwelling on the appeal of the BUF, as the National Front 
reinterpreted many of its ideas and strategies. Similarly, Labour adopted similar 
approaches to those utilised in the 1930s to combat them. Fascism’s ideological 
elasticity facilitated the construction of a complicated, if limited, electoral coalition that 
played on the concerns of working class Conservatives and industrial workers generally. 
Importantly for the textile belt, its working class support in these areas involved many 
trades linked to the cotton, wool and associated industries, including chemical workers, 
mechanics, and mill workers themselves.34 BUF rhetoric problematized global markets, 
foreign competition, and limited state support for industry and infrastructure, and 
argued a ‘Corporative State’ within the British Empire would save the ailing textile 
industry.35 It appealed to those who feared socialism and felt attacked by capital.36 By 
1934, Lancashire branches had significant memberships, forming the hub of BUF 
activity.37  
Regional historical context was important here. At this time, the south Pennine’s 
once world-leading textile industry appeared in decline. Contemporaneously, BUF 
activists became very effective in articulating the concerns various demographics’ 
during the south Lancashire ‘cotton campaigns’ of the mid-1930s.38 At the time, many 
local Labour parties maintained an internationalist critique of fascism that differed little 
from is interpretation of other extreme groups.39 Its 1933 national party statement 
conceptualised Mosley’s activities and in terms of authoritarian dictatorship, and 
applied similar terminology to Communism.40 This simultaneously underlined their 
philosophical opposition to fascism and unwillingness to collaborate in a popular front 
with other left wing groupings. This created initial political space for BUF activity, 
giving it room to grow without directly opposing it. However, through what Nigel 
Copsey has termed Labour’s ‘legalist anti-fascism’, the party’s adherence to 
constitutional norms acted to reinforced Britain’s Parliamentary, liberal democratic 
consensus against extra-parliamentary extremism at both ends of political spectrum.41 
The politics of the ballot box and the division lobby were prioritised over that of the 
street.  
Through this approach, Labour denied the BUF political space to develop their 
political appeal by avoiding formal involvement in anti-fascist protest (although some 
members did take part in a personal capacity). This strategy ensured that no traditional, 
parliamentary parties appeared on an equal footing with the fascists, to avoid gifting 
Mosley greater respectability. Local parties replicated this approach, only discussing 
BUF activities when a march took place nearby and when Labour local authorities 
denied fascists public building meeting space. All the while, national party literature 
focused on European (not neighbourhood) instances of fascism.42 BUF campaigns were 
rarely considered a threat, appearing sporadic and circumstantial, dependent on the 
availability of capital, willing activists, and specific economic circumstances. However, 
Depression-era northern England’s high unemployment ensured fascist leaders retained 
their interest in the area for both membership recruitment and potential voters. 
 Financially and organisationally, the BUF received support from the local elite, 
with members of the Lancashire Cotton Exchange and Lancashire-born aviator and 
entrepreneur A.V. Roe financing Mosley’s ambitions.43 In fact, when BUF national 
popularity faded after 1934, Mosley considered moving his headquarters to Manchester, 
to be closer to assumed support in Lancashire and Yorkshire.44 By 1934, after Labour 
sent out a questionnaire to local parties to discern BUF strength, they appeared less 
concerned by fascist appeal.45 BUF support was clearly in decline between 1934 and 
1937.46 This demonstrated a decline in party support even before the passage of the 
Public Order Act (1936), which prohibited political uniforms, militarized organisations 
and governed acceptable behaviour at processions and public meetings. 
Despite this, BUF leaders continued to hope Lancashire proved amenable to its 
appeals. As late as 1938, with 12.9 per cent unemployment and one-third of cotton 
weaving capacity and one-quarter of spinning capacity unused, Mosley undertook 
recruitment campaigns in Lancashire.47 These were unsuccessful, and BUF appeal 
declined despite continued economic problems. Although the war lessened 
unemployment statistics, BUF electoral appeal had clearly dissipated long before 1939. 
Within the context of the article, however, BUF activities demonstrated that far-right 
policies and methods were neither original nor path breaking; lessons learned 
addressing it influenced Labour’s later approach in the 1970s.  
Although the war had a counter-cyclical effect on British industry, with some 
improvement during the late 1940s and early 1950s, problems in several Lancashire 
towns such as Preston had recurred by the 1955 election. Workers were on short time 
and mills were shutting down, creating a localised electoral problem.48 Labour promised 
full employment for cotton workers and suggested government intervention was 
required.49 Similar concerns existed in Yorkshire, where the regional Labour party later 
argued for diversification in response to the decline of its wool-dominated textile 
industry.50 However, despite their concern, this never really materialised into political 
support. It was during this period that migrant workers started taking jobs in the 
industry, often aided by their own governments.51 Prospective employees were attracted 
by comparatively well paid opportunities that in Britain no longer supported the job 
security and living standards expected by working-class communities.52 For a while, 
this even led to a short-term boom.  
By the mid-1960s, there existed potential support for a movement that opposed 
immigration. An effective political consensus after 1965 remained acceptable to both 
main parties, but not necessarily the public.53 Labour’s polling expert Mark Abrams 
briefed a party policy-making study group that 80 per cent of white adults approved of 
restrictions, 40 per cent believed there should be a ‘complete ban on coloured 
immigration’, and 75 per cent believed that restrictions were not tough enough.54 
Immigration controls potential appeal to these voters was, therefore, significant and 
concerned leading party officials. The simultaneous popularity of Enoch Powell, post-
‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, had a catalytic effect and facilitated greater appeal for stricter 
immigration controls.55 Immigration was now a major political issue, and the main 
parties had to redevelop platforms, addressing this reality, to appeal to their voters. 
While uncompromising ‘immigration control’ had great appeal, how this translated into 
votes was unclear. In the post-war textile belt, what was apparent was that local 
economies were under pressure, and this affected local politics.  
Economic, social, and cultural convulsions from the early 1960s, and the failure 
of government to act convincingly, created opportunities for those seeking to replace 
established parties. Throughout its existence, National Front literature pointed to 
Labour’s 1920s displacement of the Liberal party as a major party to evidence the 
feasibility of its political ambitions.56 However, greater far-right unity was required. By 
1967, this encouraged various small groupings of radical conservatives, still-committed 
imperialists, and Hitlerite fanatics to form a new alignment.57 In both local and national 
elections, the now ‘National Front’ and similar candidates attracted voters, which 
although comparatively insignificant, concerned the Labour party locally and 
nationally.58 It constructed a policy platform around a more radical approach to 
immigration, opposing what it considered the liberal, bipartisan approach of the major 
parties.59 While its criticisms of British society and government during the 1970s views 
reflected those held by many voters, its totalitarian ambitions and divisiveness appeared 
less so.60 From the outset, whether its Mosley-esque demands for revolutionary 
transformation and racial purity had direct electoral appeal was less clear. 
Political change and growing anti-immigrant sentiment, 1967-1976 
Representative politics rarely stagnate, even if parties do. Fluid in nature, constant 
renegotiations between electors and those seeking election determined concerns, 
priorities, and approaches to problems.61 When voters felt abandoned or unrepresented, 
therefore, opportunities for extremists of varied stripes appeared. By examining 
electoral politics, therefore, it is possible to discern how party politics realigned 
between 1967 and 1976, when far-right parties began to attract votes. After examining 
the national picture, and the significance of immigration control as a political issue, 
focus must remain at the local level. Whether other local parties and candidates were 
popular and effective determined electoral purchase of a far-right platform. However, 
before 1973, such groups performance requires disaggregation. While many of them 
later merged into the National Front, they were un-integrated at this time. Therefore, 
they must be interpreted as independent organisations, autonomous of any reductionist, 
‘national’ explanation. Similarly, we must consider the extent to which local political 
parties reflected local peculiarities, problems, and political dynamics. 
Labour party politics in the textile belt underwent significant economic and 
demographic change in the post-war years, which influenced the composition of local 
parties, affecting both internal party and local political culture. 62 More affluent working 
class members moved to the suburbs and traditional employment patterns altered, while 
growing numbers of middle-class activists, particularly in university towns, joined local 
parties.63 To an extent, local changes affected party membership. The closure of 
unionised industries disconnected their workforces from clear influence within the 
labour movement, and declining interest in political activity weakening the activist base 
of local party organisations.64 Community-level changes interacted with a changing 
national political landscape. Labour’s poor electoral record in the 1950s, the 
unpopularity of its policies in government, and nationwide organisational changes away 
from constituency activism, left local parties less reflective of alerted local 
demographics.65 Textile belt parties reflected national trends, with declining 
memberships and limited funds destabilising constituency and ward-level parties, which 
concerned regional-level party organisers.66 Changes in the employment, residence, and 
political inclinations of both working and middle class members and voters reflected 
wider social changes, and constrained Labour’s traditional appeal. However, while this 
context was important, the divisiveness of some political issues emphasised cleavages 
already present among Labour’s electoral coalition. 
By 1968, immigration was such an issue. Many party members and voters, even 
in constituencies untouched by immigration, appreciated the impact of Powell’s 
rhetoric.67 Meanwhile, left-wing members opposed the Labour Government giving any 
ground whatsoever. For example, James Callaghan’s Commonwealth Immigration Act 
(1968) seen as illiberal and unbecoming of a socialist party.68 Yet, despite this 
legislation and the Conservatives’ 1971 Immigration Act, National Front leaders rightly 
determined that many voters believed existing immigration controls were insufficient.69 
Immigration was not the political issue it had been in 1968, but retained a degree of 
salience amongst other great issues of the day, including Vietnam, Northern Ireland, and 
Britain’s economic problems.70 It was into the political space provided by apparent 
main party consensus that a united anti-immigration party campaigned in areas with 
large immigration problems.  
In Bradford West, post-war immigration affected two out of four wards. It had 
the seventh highest percentage of immigrant voters in a UK constituency, and was a 
safe Labour seat after the boundary changes of 1974.71 In 1970, however, ward-level 
parties in Bradford Moor, Little Horton, Great Horton, and Manningham barely met or 
functioned.72 Dwindling memberships and underfunding undermined local activism.73 
Alongside this, in parties like the Leeds Borough party, only 10 per cent of members 
were ‘willing to work’, of more than 500 members needed to maintain solvency.74 
These understaffed parties in the textile belt were unable to interact with voters, and 
their union affiliates only reflected certain industries. Labour had underdeveloped 
historic linkages with textile worker unions, which rarely affiliated to the party or 
sponsored MPs; leaving local parties less attuned to their concerns.75 Similarly, that 
MPs rarely visited or held surgeries compounded existent CLP organisational issues.76 
Interactions between MPs, party members, and electors were, therefore, 
underdeveloped.  
Political participation had dwindled in post-war Britain. Prospective party 
members appeared disinterested, and some CLP officers were unwilling to recruit new 
members, who would undermine their control over local party management.77 When 
attempted, novel campaign methods were unsuccessful, and even Yorkshire’s Regional 
Organiser echoed the over-optimistic view that ‘where there is life, there is hope’.78 
Changes in both community and party demography weakened urban party articulation 
of local concerns, as CLPs became disengaged with affiliated organisations, such as 
trades’ union branches. Sometimes this created opportunities for so-called ‘entryism’, 
facilitating a leftward ideological shift that emphasised the cleavage between local 
parties and voters, but it often meant that CLPs simply struggled to maintain any 
meaningful activity.79 While local issues still dominated debates in municipal 
assemblies, local CLPs were less engaged.  
Regional economic realignments, in particular textile industry rationalisation, 
brought increased unemployment in seats where Labour had struggled in 1970.80 Much-
trumpeted attempts by textile belt MPs operate as a ‘textile group’ in Parliament 
brought little relief.81  Other industries, such as coal, iron and steel, engineering, were 
heavily associated with textiles, meaning that 20.4 per cent of the West Yorkshire 
workforce been employed directly in the industry, and many more associated with it.82 
Collaboration with extra-parliamentary groups, such as the textile unions, remained 
inadequate and between 1961 and 1977, two-thirds of textile jobs were lost.83 Limited 
industrial investment compounded the rigours of international competition.84 The 
industry was under varied and complicated stresses, linked to long-term 
underinvestment, changing global markets, and more efficient competitors, that no 
government had or could alleviate.85 Neither nationalisation nor significant state support 
were forthcoming and the reorganisation that the 1959 Cotton Industry Act merely 
funded rationalisation, replaced the machinery, and supported the redundancies the 
process created.86 Employment concerns created fears, which made voters susceptible to 
emotive, conservative appeals. 
In this context, National Front developed promises to preserve Britain’s 
‘traditional way of life’, end the deflationary influence of international capital, and 
advocate for protectionism for British manufacturing, had an opening.87 National Front 
literature blamed Britain’s economic problems over-powerful, whose activities 
responded to ‘real grievances’ caused by the malign influence of international capital.88 
Such an interpretation, similar in conception and purpose to the earlier BUF, was 
purposefully vague. Anti-Semitism, isolationist nationalism, and multi-layered 
conspiracies informed different aspects of party ideology, and were present on varied 
levels of visibility.89 A racialized worldview underpinned other areas of rhetoric; it is 
notable that rather than engaging with the more comparable German Wirtschaftswunder, 
Front journal Spearhead obsessed over the economic success of Japan.90 However, 
while racial prejudice was an undoubted ideological underpinning, National Front 
leaders refashioned policies to address wider public concerns over industrial 
realignment and worsening industrial relations. In election literature, international 
culpability for British problems was emphasised.91 Local activists made links between 
economic problems and far-right successes. Halifax CLP activists later observed 
Britain’s economic weaknesses provided greater opportunities to the National Front.92 It 
was apparent that, if a clear political message was fashioned, and a strategy found to 
mobilise sufficient voters, the National Front could develop its electoral appeal in 
specific electoral climates.    
Economic restructuring created a complicated electoral context within which the 
Labour party had to operate, and voters had myriad concerns. Sociologist Duncan 
Scott’s contemporaneous ethnographic study of Huddersfield recorded the presence of 
anti-migrant views, the influence of pro-Front activists, and the significance of 
deindustrialisation on voters inhabiting textile belt towns.93 These localised issues with 
post-war immigration went back as far as the voluntary labour schemes after the war.94 
Migrant numbers in some wards was significant. By 1969, Huddersfield had an 
immigrant population of 11,400 in a town of c.130, 000 inhabitants.95 Labour’s 1965 
circular, which limited the number of immigrants in classrooms to 1/3, meaning many 
schoolchildren were ‘bussed out’ to schools in parts of the city with lower migrant 
figures.96 Officials deemed this a common-sense approach to facilitate integration and 
avoid community segregation.97 In this context, immigration became a ‘problem’ local 
government resolved. Despite their concerns over appearances of Nazi graffiti, local 
Labour parties rarely discussed migration or far-right activity.98 Although national 
stances caused damage, localised party management issues, such as low membership, 
inactive branches and, in occasional cases, demographic changes in constituencies and 
the composition of constituency party memberships, were problematic. 
As was often the case with the far-right electoral activity, national political 
intervention heightened community concerns over migration.99 As one Huddersfield 
National Front organiser observed, before Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, 
‘only cranks and perverts’ joined the group, now it attracted Conservative voters.100 
Powell had transferred respectability onto formerly fringe and ignored political 
agendas.101 In Huddersfield, there was a clear interaction between right-wing 
Conservative party and members of the far right.102Alongside this, the Front contested 
most of Huddersfield’s council wards and maintained an average of 12 per cent of the 
vote in 1969 and 10 per cent in 1970.103 Conservative voters appeared to express 
growing anti-migrant sentiment.  Reacting to this, Huddersfield West Labour MP 
Kenneth Lomas then spoke in favour of greater restriction.104 Powellism and the 
national debate on immigration and integration had increased the electoral purchase of 
continued immigration control among voters.  
After their initial success, the Front planned to open a regional headquarters in 
Huddersfield.105 Once again, perceived failings regarding immigration control while in 
government constrained Labour’s ability to promote its successes, giving opponents 
opportunities to undermine its electoral appeal. As an organisation, the National Front 
influenced the agenda, rather than secured election. After the 1970 election, the Front’s 
Huddersfield branch changed direction. Initial success impressed leader A.K. 
Chesterton and the group planned two demonstrations in the town.106 Front 
organisational problems undermined its electoral strategy.107 Their initial successes 
came to nothing in the General Election.108  
Whether it was due to the change in Conservative policy before the election, or 
the presence of Powell, voters backed Edward Heath’s Conservatives rather than far-
right groups.109 There was a significant decline in electoral support compared to the 
1969 municipal elections. Instead, far-right group focused on disrupting meetings of the 
UN Association, the Labour party and the local Community Relations Commission, 
rather than canvassing for votes.110 In September 1970, National Front journal Candour 
suggested that their heckling of black politician, David Pitt, had made them a household 
name.111 Again, their candidates problematized immigration, and developed its potential 
as a cleavage issue that reinforced their standing as a protest vote. Party loyalty was 
irrelevant. Such voters support was transient, reflecting their concerns over immigration 
rather than a wholesale purchase of a political creed.  
If anything, growing anti-migrant politics was more problematic for the 
Conservatives. Many of their local associations developed a tougher approach towards 
immigration.112 Bradford West’s Conservative MP Arthur Tiley spoke of the importance 
to Bradford of immigration without being overly welcoming.113 This was not without 
cause. From an early date, groups like the Yorkshire Campaign to Stop Immigration 
(YCSI) were active in the city.114 Formed by dyer and Conservative activist Jim 
Merrick in June 1970 to contest a municipal by-election in Tong ward, early rhetoric 
commonly reused traditional tropes linking immigrant presence with increased crime 
and disease.115 In Tong, Merrick took 419 votes (17 per cent of those cast), receiving 
only 60 less than the Conservative council candidate did, a reasonable result.116 Local 
Conservatives then strengthened their anti-migrant rhetoric.117 Within the city, the local 
Labour party appeared unconcerned.   
Bradford Labour politicians were inconsistent on how to address Merrick’s 
activities. One party organiser argued that Labour ignore the YCSI’s impact, as it 
predominantly affected Conservative appeal.118 However, when the YCSI fielded 13 
candidates in the 1971 council election, it encouraged Labour’s Bradford agent to 
underplay immigration ‘as much as possible’ in the campaign.119 Among a difficult 
electoral environment in Bradford, Labour were right to be wary. The YCSI adapted to 
move beyond Bradford. They rebranded several times, becoming the British Campaign 
to Stop Immigration (BCSI) in 1971, and merged with the Racial Preservation Society 
in 1972 on their way to eventual National Front affiliation.120 Their ambitions were 
clear, and despite some bemusement at sometimes-bizarre campaigning activities, they 
occupied an under-contested political space and targeted salient local concerns over 
migrant concerns and economic difficulties.121 That Labour local government leaders 
organised a discussion on immigration and local politics at their 1972 conference, 
demonstrated some party officials were aware of potential problems.122 Further to this, 
events in Rochdale demonstrated immigration control had localised appeal beyond 
Bradford’s confines.  
The Liberal victory in Rochdale was primarily due to other local and political 
factors. Their candidate, former Labour Mayor Cyril Smith, had substantial name 
recognition and popular appeal.123 However, also on the ballot was the BCSI’s Jim 
Merrick who was testing his electoral popularity outside of his Bradford heartland.124 
He took a significant 4,074 votes, and his presence had catalysed many Pakistani 
residents to vote.125 Its presence affected the election outcome, and Merrick’s limited 
success troubled Rochdale CLP. It decided that, where another far-right candidate to 
stand in Rochdale, the regional organiser must record districts where these candidates’ 
votes originated, to determine their impact on the Labour vote.126 In addition, national 
party newspaper Labour Weekly conceded Merrick’s campaign ‘must have made some 
inroads into the traditional Labour vote’.127 The BCSI’s electoral appeal disturbed 
mainstream parties and demonstrated the potential influence of immigration electoral 
politics. While Merrick’s organisation was small and only capable of individual, non-
consecutive campaigns, they had gained a greater presence within national media 
consciousness.  
Increased vote shares in seats like Rochdale demonstrated the appeal of 
immigration control was more complicated than mere localised peculiarity. A pattern of 
underlying economic problems, disengaged municipal and parliamentary 
representatives, and subsequent voter disenchantment was clearly omnipresent. Events 
in Blackburn further underlined this trend. Here, local textile factories were 
uncompetitive, wages had stagnated, and Commonwealth migrants had replaced white 
working class residents in their jobs and traditional areas of occupation.128 Local 
government inspired slum clearances and city-centre redevelopment limited available 
housing stock, with migrants adding to these pressures.129 Linked to this, the local 
Labour party membership declined and the Blackburn MP, Barbara Castle, appeared 
both distant and unaware of immigration control’s appeal.130 In this environment, 
troublemaking right-wing activists like John Kingsley Read (then Conservative, later 
National Front), tried to use local dissatisfaction over enforced clearances to gauge their 
political traction.131 Seeing how these concerns underpinned dissatisfaction, Read 
translated his far-right worldview into rhetoric that was critical of local problems to 
mobilise a larger coalition of voters.  
Read’s careful, comparative moderation and his creation of the ‘Strasserite’ 
(more populist) National Party enabled success in the 1976 local elections.132 His 
organisation secured two council seats with significant results in six wards. With an 
average vote of 29.4 per cent of votes, this was a significant coup for Read’s 
approach.133 To other regional CLPs, Read became exemplar of anti-immigrant 
activism, against which local equivalents were measured.134 Initially presenting itself as 
a populist organisation, dissociated from the National Front’s underlying fascism, the 
National Party’s underlying agenda was only revealed later. Read had regularly 
circulated holocaust denial literature around the National Party, but only when he told a 
1976 rally that the murder of a young Sikh in Southall represented ‘one down, a million 
to go’ were his views publicly clear.135 This was a clear example of a candidate 
moderating his message to mobilise voters, before Read was caught out. That Preston 
South MP Stan Thorne requested a Parliamentary debate to discuss the speeches content 
demonstrates Read’s success at developing this moderate image.136 After a difficult year 
at the national and local level, Labour had appeared vulnerable in constituency Barbara 
Castle had represented since 1945. 
Despite such concerns, however, National Party influence declined quickly. By 
the following year, the National Party only secured 11.9 per cent of the vote in the 
Lancashire County Council elections.137 A series of local government by-elections 
throughout 1976 suggested these were aberrant textile belt concerns rather than any far-
right capture of the political zeitgeist.138 Labour had successfully challenged the 
National Front vote in Sandwell (that included the former borough of Smethwick) and 
the National Party’s two seats in Blackburn.139 At the latter, election irregularities 
forced a by-election in one of the seats, when the Labour candidate secured a majority 
of 830.140 Concerns then dissipated when the National Front won a smaller average 
(11.9 per cent) in the Lancashire County Council elections of 1977.141 While the 
Blackburn-based National Party’s success had caused concern within the local Labour 
Party, its success was short-lived. 
During the 1974 elections, the National Front had altered its image to persuade 
voters that it was now a ‘respectable political party’.142 This clearly failed, and if 
anything, the elections damaged far-right appeal due to the greater importance of 
national, economic issues on the campaign. A relative by-election ‘success’ in West 
Bromwich in 1973 provided momentum, and by standing over 50 candidates in each 
election, the party qualified for a simultaneous five-minute election broadcast on the 
BBC 1 and ITV, two of  the UK’s three national television stations.143 After both 1974 
elections, Labour’s National Agency Department review of National Front activity, 
observed that (despite multiple legal infringements), it had succeeded in appearing 
respectable, as opposed to rabble-rousing.144 While this did not directly increase far-
right popularity, it demonstrated that the National Front’s first wave of popularity in 
1972-3 had concerned Labour headquarters. 
For Labour ultra-respectability, and a clearer and more popular manifesto, was 
problematic. Such an opponent might syphon off Labour votes, which might prove 
decisive electorally, given the close nature of 1974s General Elections. In such a 
scenario, effective far-right parties might split the working class along racial lines, 
maintaining Conservative control.145 Although much has been made of the 1972 and 
1976 increases in support tied to the arrival of Ugandan and Malawian Asians, the 1974 
General Elections were equally significant.146 They altered the electoral parameters, 
returning focus to national (rather than local) politics. To Labour, the far-right groups 
remained problematic vote-splitters, as opposed to major threats, but concerns were 
already present. The economy determined Labour’s electoral strategy, but they did not 
ignore far-right groupings and their previous appeal. Institutionally, at both local and 
national levels, many individuals had already realised they needed a more effective 
response to far-right populism. 
Local parties and anti-fascism campaigning 
At both local and national levels, Labour began to develop strategies to combat the 
party’s declining popularity in a number of constituencies where racialism affected 
electoral performance. Comparative far-right (particularly National party) electoral 
successes at Blackburn and Deptford then crystallised and catalysed Labour thinking.147 
Senior figures within Labour’s Headquarters recognised the scale of the problem. 
Increased discussion of race relations after the party’s 1976 conference led National 
Organiser Reg Underhill to visit ‘selected constituency parties in areas where the 
problem…was particularly intense’.148 That most of these constituencies sat within the 
South Pennine textile belt emphasised the regionalised nature of the problem. Underhill 
visited Blackburn, Preston, Accrington, Nelson and Colne, Bradford, Huddersfield, 
Batley and Morley, Dewsbury, and Keighley.149 In these constituencies, Underhill 
found insufficient action had been undertaken, and that anti-racialism campaigning was 
required.  
Political engagement was key. Local parties wanted to oppose racial nationalists, 
and were aware of their appeal. Bradford CLPs reported high National Front voting 
intention in traditional Labour areas.150 However, Labour tactics were ill defined, and 
advice was often contradictory. Several parties informed Underhill that dealing with 
constituents one-by-one was more effective than public meetings and mass publicity 
campaigns. Large events also attracted National Front members who interrupted 
them.151 While Labour had many experienced members, these were volunteers trained 
to solicit votes. This required different talents to engaging with far-right activists willing 
to utilise violence to achieve their ends. It was now clear that Labour’s non-engagement 
strategy (or non-strategy) had failed. However, in a Labour party where a changing 
membership had gained more influence in political activities, anti-racist activism gained 
purchase among party activists.   
For the first time, a centrally coordinated, focused strategy was attempted. 
Headquarters staff organised Labour’s ‘Campaign against Racial Discrimination’ to 
combat discontent and tension inspired by immigration and failed integration policies. 
Alongside London-based events, including a November 1976 demonstration held in 
London, the party undertook leafletting, demonstrations, and a national television 
broadcast that was well-received by pro-immigration groups within the party.152 
Leading figures, including Cabinet Ministers Michael Foot and Merlyn Rees, and union 
leader Tom Jackson, addressed the event.153 This ensured it was no longer a fringe 
campaign, but one that engaged many activists. Several marches had already occurred 
in constituencies before the launch of the central campaign, with one organised jointly 
by the Halifax CLP and other left-wing groups occurring the day before.154 It also 
signalled Labour’s belated attempt to confront the far right. However, while it engaged 
with the campaigning interests of many party members, it is unclear how it was 
supposed to engage with voters concerned with immigration. 
Alongside this, the central party tasked CLPs to monitor the impact of local 
media and increase party recruitment amongst minority groups.155 Local party groups 
campaigned against ‘racialism’, but they also had to adapt to new electorates. Changes 
created by the Local Government Act (1972), that constituted new County and District 
level authorities, required new elections to both bodies.156 In Blackburn, the National 
Front secured an average of 20 per cent of votes across two seats contested in the April 
election to the County Council, and 23 per cent in the June election to the new District 
Council.157 The poor state of local parties in Blackburn contributed to this, despite 
protestations by Lancashire’s Young Socialist (YS) groups; campaigns by the local 
Labour Party did little to alter voters’ intentions.158 Across Lancashire, and the North-
West more broadly, there were concerns as to Labour’s electoral unpopularity.159  
This did not stop YS groups organising campaigns. In early 1974, a number of 
YS sections organised meetings to discuss the impact of the National Front on local 
politics, and racialism in society more generally. A meeting of Preston, Chorley, and 
Leyland Labour Party YS was organised for this purpose for Tuesday 15 January.160 A 
further, national YS conference was organised at Bradford for 16 February 1974, which 
branches across the north highlighted and had members attempting to attend.161 
However, activists cancelled the event when the Bradford Labour Party withdrew 
support and Ted Heath called the February 1974 election.162  Despite setbacks, YS 
groups remained active promoters of improved race relations, and championed the 
creation of local committees.163 While many party activists were now willing to take 
part in anti-racism campaigning, those at the highest levels of the party and government 
had divided loyalties between sympathy for the cause and their status as guarantors of 
law and order.  
Labour’s Organisation Committee discussed with the Home Secretary whether 
he would allow local party involvement in anti-racism activities.164 With increased far-
right activity across the region, the North-West regional party conference in 1977 
debated motions brought forward by the Moss Side and Hulme CLPs.165 However, not 
all party CLP committees were keen to engage with far right activism. In Mirfield, local 
activists expressed concern over their local councillor speaking out about the National 
Front.166 Manchester County Borough Labour party’s executive encouraged local 
parties to request the police to ban marches, cautioning CLPs that anti-fascist activity 
could lead to violence.167 In Parliament, Salford East MP Frank Allaun demanded the 
Government accept that the ‘National Front is a Racialist Front’. He advocated banning 
their marches and meetings through the racial incitement provisions in the Race 
Relations Act, 1976.168 However, despite these concerns, activists continued to organise 
events, and race relations became a regular discussion point in local party meetings.  
Local party organisations were far from inactive. CLPs in Huddersfield and 
Dewsbury attempted to address social problems caused by poor integration, and formed 
race relations committees.169 Oldham’s Labour Council organised and oversaw anti-
racism activities rather than the CLPs.170 Correspondence from the central party and a 
looming national campaign, often brought immigration to the committee table.171 Far-
right activism was not ignored. As was the case in other parties, the Oldham party 
decided that racism and immigration should sit within the purview of constituency 
(therefore national) politics rather than local issues.172  While some credited popular 
activism with the decline of National Front popularity, many members recognised that 
increased unemployment had the potential to undo much good work.173 Indeed, the 
necessity to address problems that burnished the National Front’s appeal led to some 
local parties taking unprecedented steps.  
This electoral appeal facilitated a willingness to work with other local left wing 
groups united against racism. In Halifax, the CLP agreed to work with other local leftist 
groups.174 Encouraged by the party’s national campaign, the local party demanded a 
rigorous campaign, challenging all forms of racism.175 Halifax CLP had acted because 
an active National Front branch had become active within the borough, primarily in the 
Mixenden area.176 As part of this and the party’s wider campaign, its General 
Management Committee supported the foundation of a new cross party ‘Calderdale 
Action against Racism’ group that included the local Communist party. This group 
organised a party rally for the day before the November 1976 national rally in Hyde 
Park.177 CLPs in some constituencies actively organised against the existent local racial 
nationalists. 
These actions were not all part of grand, overarching, and planned campaign. 
Solitary events and gestures were often the foundation and mainstay of local party 
actions on race relations. Huddersfield East CLP held several anti-racism walks, 
encouraged by local MP J.P.W. Mallalieu, to demonstrate its opposition to 
discrimination. 178 Heywood and Royton, and Rochdale CLPs’ formed an anti-racism 
committee, and its secretary addressed the Oldham District party about National Front 
activity in the North-West.179 These activities were formalised after 1976, by the 
formation of an anti-racialist sub-committee with the Huddersfield West CLP earlier in 
the year, as part of Labour’s wider campaign against racialism.180 This grouping then 
organised an ‘anti-racist week’ for September 1977.181 Mallalieu was at the centre of 
this initiative, and delivered an address that opposed the twin concerns of domestic 
racism and Apartheid.182 Again, much of this activity was ground-up, developed with 
little input from party headquarters or leadership. The changing interests of MPs and 
activists was more influential than any campaign organised in party headquarters. 
By 1978, Labour members’ liberal-left internationalism influenced the local 
parties’ approaches, but often their efforts represented tokenism wrapped in a veneer of 
moral righteousness. Members sat on regional committees and MPs delivered ‘vigorous 
and tub-thumping’ speeches against Powell and the National Front, but this was gesture 
politics rather than constructive action.183 In reality, such regional organisation 
messages only gained purchase after far-right marches took place or fascist activists 
interrupted CLP meetings.184 Electoral appeal still dominated thinking. While MPs 
criticised racism, they also emphasised the success of immigration control and made 
limited references to the role of immigrants.185 As with earlier in the decade, Labour 
‘shied away from controversy which could alienate potential support’.186 As with 
politics in Bradford, the presence of a large immigrant community focused minds. 
While anti-racist activities occurred within the party, its public rhetoric remained 
measured and in line with national policy.  
This activism was never comprehensive, and was very reliant on the inclination 
and interest of the CLPs more active members. While Halifax and Huddersfield 
developed aggressive strategies, Bradford West refused to join activities organised by 
an affiliated anti-fascist sub-committee.187 Even within Bradford, there were differing 
views. Suburban Shipley CLP were more concerned by the rise of the National Front, 
discussed fascist activities in the north, and invited the Chair of the Bradford Race 
Relations Board to discuss race relations.188 The CLP then passed a resolution that 
demanded the Government ban the National Front and the National Party, a request 
forwarded to the Home Secretary Merlyn Rees and the party’s National Executive 
Committee.189 Demonstrating the complex mixture of viewpoints present within party 
and government, the Home Office responded that though they shared the sentiment, the 
Government had to preserve freedom of expression.190 Within a single city, these 
contradictory views demonstrated the extent to which local party opinions diverged, and 
how the composition of a local party, as well as the socio-economic realities of their 
populations, interacted with a changing political climate.  
While these nationally planned campaigns demonstrated that the central Labour 
party was willing to become more involved in anti-racialist activity, they were not the 
primary catalysts for action. Nationwide campaign groups, including the Race Relations 
Action Group, organised meetings attended by local party members, and fed into 
localised debates over anti-fascist activity.191 Events were then organised by local 
trades’ councils to facilitate activity between interested activists in the political parties 
and unions.192 Context was again crucial. Many local voters did not welcome lectures 
on tolerance by activists and MPs from neighbouring constituencies, never mind from 
party headquarters. Penistone’s Labour MP John Mendelson received correspondence 
from Sheffield Attercliffe residents and National Front activists criticising his 
statements on racial discrimination from the comfort of his rural constituency.193 
Alongside these groups, it was the willingness of CLPs and activists themselves to 
define whether action was most effective.  
What had become clear was that, while Labour’s activities were significant, its 
leadership were unwilling (and unable) to join with other left-wing organisations in any 
‘popular front’. Labour’s situation was more precarious than the 1930s. Its leaders held 
ministerial office, which tied them to conventions of British constitutional 
government.194 Nigel Copsey and David Renton have both discussed the role of around 
40-50 Labour MPs including Tony Benn, Dennis Skinner, Martin Flannery, and future 
leader Neil Kinnock, and activists such as Peter Hain, within the Anti-Nazi League 
(ANL).195 However, their activities made little impression on local Labour parties in the 
textile belt, being unmentioned in their minute books. This was because Socialist 
Worker’s party activists dominated ANL branches in Sheffield, Huddersfield, 
Rotherham, Bradford, Pontefract, Wakefield, Manchester, and Leeds.196 It remained 
clear that Labour prioritised its own, internal campaigns, and sought to avoid alliances 
with the far-left, which would provide voters and opponents evidence of a leftward. 
However, changes in party management, with less emphasis on discipline and greater 
openness towards changing conceptions of socialism were likely to be significant. 
While leaders preferred activists to focus on Labour only campaigns, they did little to 
stop engagement in others.  
As with their activities against the BUF, Labour avoided street campaigns and 
prioritised formal marches and administrative activity to combat National Front activity. 
To respond to public discussions around migration and race, the Labour leadership 
utilised the central party in a strategic role, focusing on the national picture. Labour’s 
response to Margaret Thatcher’s developing anti-immigration rhetoric in the later 1970s 
was exemplar of this practice. As CLPs addressed local instances of racial discontent 
dependent on far-right activity, the central party engaged when issues entered the 
national press. Thatcher’s intervention in the March 1978 Ilford South by-election, 
where she sympathised with voters feeling ‘swamped’ by immigration (much to the 
chagrin of the National Front), provided such an opportunity.197 A London by-election, 
it raised little comment among local parties.  
Despite this, Labour Home Secretary (and Leeds South MP) Merlyn Rees used it 
as an opening to criticise Conservative policy, delivering two speeches at the Oxford 
University Labour Club and Leeds’s Rothwell Labour Club.198 Rees’ rhetoric gained 
reaction from the press; the formerly Labour-supporting Sun dubbed him a ‘bully’ for 
his forthright response to the Conservative leader.199 Tellingly, apart from Rees’ ill-
fared intervention at Rothwell, there was little discussion of Thatcher’s new approach 
within textile belt CLPs. Such limited impact demonstrates the localised nature of 
Labour anti-racism activism, which was rarely in-line with interventions at the national 
party and governmental levels. However, arguments in the press had little, if any, effect 
on National Front appeal. As with the BUF predecessor four decades before, by 1979 
National Fronts electoral support had dissipated.200 Even after the highpoint of 1976-77, 
the far right continued to attract headlines despite the fact most of their transient voters 
had moved on. 
Conclusion 
This article cannot be conclusive. Limited evidence deposited in archives by far-right 
activists preclude this. Similarly, CLP papers only present the motivations of those 
sufficiently active to produce a paper trail.201 Such a paucity of evidence can lead to 
ascribing too much credit where undue. However, it is clear that neither the National 
Front, the National Party, nor their antecedents’ never achieved parliamentary 
representation, often securing more headlines than votes. What they demonstrated was 
an ability to affect local political contest outcomes and newspaper coverage of 
community-level politics. Although initially perceived as a greater threat to 
Conservatives due to the significance of Powellism in their late 1960s ascent, the far 
right became a threat to both main parties. There were clear links between long-term 
social and economic change, post-war migration, and the continued importance of 
localised factors within textile belt electoral politics, where Labour was the dominant 
party. While the far right did not create these conditions, they maximised opportunities 
within a complicated political climate, created by economic change.  
In reality, this difficult socio-economic context defined the space within which 
all political parties operated, constraining potential strategies. Industrial realignment and 
associated socio-cultural change created serious policy problems, as inner city squalor 
and other concerns constrained Labour’s appeal. Far right activists blamed migrants for 
the lack of jobs and poor housing stock, a situation predominantly caused by the decline 
of textile manufacture in its Victorian form. How a scapegoating political myth, based 
around immigrants, gained wide purchase among voters in areas sharing a similar socio-
economic experience requires further consideration. Far right ‘success’ was contingent 
upon several factors, including an effective political strategy, sufficient amenable 
voters, and the clear articulation of a far-right vision of Britain. In the wider textile belt, 
therefore, this helps explain the significance of industrial changes including, but not 
limited to, textiles. Mainstream parties demonstrated an ignorance to these problems, 
which aided the continued pervasiveness of far-right politics.  
The serious impact of post-war economic realignment on these communities 
requires deeper understanding, to allow better appreciate of how local contexts 
influenced voters’ political choices. The significance of local party composition and 
activism is important here. Alongside changes in the wider socio-economic 
environment, internal party changes constrained the selection of alternative political 
strategies. Changing interests and approaches represented the growing influence more 
radical party membership. However, there were beneficial side effects. By the late-
1970s, CLPs campaigned against fascism and societal racial discrimination in a way 
that reflected these changing party attitudes. Opposition to the National Front reflected a 
process of political change within the Labour party. Widely held views on 
internationalism, left-wing socialism, and colonial liberation reinforced anti-racialist 
campaigns, underpinning greater commitment to creating a more egalitarian society.202  
Understanding the impact, as well as the intention, of such groups is important. 
Contested notions and interpretations of Britishness simultaneously provided members 
for anti-racism campaigns and the organisations they opposed. Anti-migrant, far-right 
organisations gained traction because some voters and many in the press believed in the 
continued electoral appeal of immigration control as a common-sense policy solution. 
Margaret Thatcher’s rhetorical interventions in 1978, defending immigration control 
within a wider package of measures, reinforced this interpretation. As with Labour’s 
actions in the 1930s, Callaghan’s party avoided an informal, street protest-based 
campaign, refusing to ban any political organisations. Once again, Labour committed to 
formal politics and reinforced Britain’s parliamentary system. Far-right organisations 
demonstrated credible, if limited, political strategies and appeals. To view their electoral 
participation as merely a smokescreen for racialism oversimplifies complex and 
contrary rationales for that activity. Had National Front members wanted to intimidate 
migrant communities or engage in violence, there were easier routes than forming 
political movements and seeking election.  
Rather, the leadership and activists of groups like the National Front, its rivals 
and predecessors were effective political operators making use of amenable, temperate 
socio-economic conditions to further their political agendas. While they reflected 
extreme minority views, they determined opportunities to use the electoral process to 
further their various, and often contradictory, agendas. That far-right appeal increased 
despite the 1964-1970 Wilson Governments adoption of immigration control, and the 
presence of Powell on the Conservative benches suggested more complicated factors 
were at play. As happened with the BNP in the 2000s, mainstream parties’ earlier 
failure to clarify links between immigration, housing, and services clearly provided 
opportunities for National Front appeals.203 Few parties were willing to admit that 
limited resources, administrative inefficiency and, at times, poor municipal leadership 
were to blame. Organised anti-immigrant parties benefitted from perceptions that 
established parties had failed to address problems, a view echoed (for different reasons) 
by Labour’s radically socialist party membership from the mid-1970s. How local 
parties, of all political creeds, interacted with historic electoral processes and complex 
social issues including immigration, clearly requires further analysis. 
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